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Abstract
The domain of strategic interaction includes all those decision tasks in which the
outcome of a decision depends on the decisions taken by a plurality of individuals,
so that each individual must try to devise the most likely moves of the others
in order to pursue the best course of action, knowing that all other actors are
engaged in the same type of strategic thinking. Problems of strategic interaction
in economics have been traditionally modelled using the formal language of game
theory, first introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 1944 seminal book
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Game theory subsequently developed
into a highly formal mathematical language used to describe the behavior of hyper-
rational individuals in strategic contexts. Although born as a branch of applied
mathematics and originally developed with the intention of making it the science
of military conflict, its diffusion within economics has been extremely rapid, and
related fields in the social sciences have recently begun to apply it to model behavior
in a variety of social settings.
However, in the last decade, the usefulness of abstract game theory in predicting
the behavior of individuals in real strategic settings has been increasingly brought
into question, given the highly unrealistic assumptions about human rationality
on which most of its models are based (e.g., Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). As a
consequence, the field of behavioral game theory has emerged (e.g., Camerer 2003a),
with the purpose of building more descriptive theories of strategic behavior by
relying on empirical observations of how real people actually solve strategic problems
in laboratory experiments, and by drawing on psychological theories of reasoning,
problem solving and decision making to give an account of human behavior in
games. This paper is an attempt at illustrating, by means of a few examples,
part of the ongoing research in behavioral game theory (and the closely related
field of experimental economics) especially as it concerns the two domains of social
preferences and bounded rationality.
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